This paper summarizes a theory of cognitive development and elaborates on its educational implications. The theory postulates that development occurs in cycles along multiple fronts. Cognitive competence in each cycle comprises a different profile of executive, inferential, and awareness processes, reflecting changes in developmental priorities in each cycle. Changes reflect varying needs in representing, understanding, and interacting with the world. Interaction control dominates episodic representation in infancy; attention control and perceptual awareness dominate in realistic representations in preschool; inferential control and (...) awareness dominate rule-based representation in primary school; truth and validity control and precise self-evaluation dominate in principle-based thought in adolescence. We demonstrate that the best predictors of school learning in each cycle are the cycle’s cognitive priorities. Also learning in different domains, e.g., language and mathematics, depends on an interaction between the general cognitive processes dominating in each cycle and the state of the representational systems associated with each domain. When a representational system is deficient, specific learning difficulties may emerge, e.g., dyslexia and dyscalculia. We also discuss the educational implications for evaluation and learning at school. (shrink)

Debate between Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota Morris) and Michael Huemer (Philosophy, Colorado), forthcoming in Problems in Applied Ethics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Steven Cowan, ed. (Bloomsbury). The main essays are 5000 words or fewer; replies are 1500 words or fewer. This penultimate version is published here with permission from the editor.

The present war in Ukraine has seen millions of women flee as refugees, while martial law forbids adult men under 60 from leaving the country. According to various reports, many and perhaps most women Ukrainian refugees are breaking romantic ties with the men they leave behind, building new lives with men in their countries of refuge, and/or planning never to return. I avoid any comment about the morality of these events, and instead take up the general question of whether women (...) war refugees have any obligations of “connubial loyalty” to their menfolk in circumstances where those men are discharging a moral obligation to fight in the war that precipitated their womenfolk’s flight in the first place. I answer that they do. (shrink)

This is also where we begin investigating lattices of logics and varieties, rather than particular examples.

Two constructions for adding an involution operator to residuated ordered monoids are investigated. One preserves integrality and the mingle axiom x 2x but fails to preserve the contraction property xx 2. The other has the opposite preservation properties. Both constructions preserve commutativity as well as existent nonempty meets and joins and self-dual order properties. Used in conjunction with either construction, a result of R.T. Brady can be seen to show that the equational theory of commutative distributive residuated lattices (without involution) (...) is decidable, settling a question implicitly posed by P. Jipsen and C. Tsinakis. The corresponding logical result is the (theorem-) decidability of the negation-free axioms and rules of the logic RW, formulated with fusion and the Ackermann constant t. This completes a result of S. Giambrone whose proof relied on the absence of t. (shrink)

It is well known that classical propositional logic can be interpreted in intuitionistic propositional logic. In particular Glivenko's theorem states that a formula is provable in the former iff its double negation is provable in the latter. We extend Glivenko's theorem and show that for every involutive substructural logic there exists a minimum substructural logic that contains the first via a double negation interpretation. Our presentation is algebraic and is formulated in the context of residuated lattices. In the last part (...) of the paper, we also discuss some extended forms of the Kolmogorov translation and we compare it to the Glivenko translation. (shrink)

Given a positive universal formula in the language of residuated lattices, we construct a recursive basis of equations for a variety, such that a subdirectly irreducible residuated lattice is in the variety exactly when it satisfies the positive universal formula. We use this correspondence to prove, among other things, that the join of two finitely based varieties of commutative residuated lattices is also finitely based. This implies that the intersection of two finitely axiomatized substructural logics over FL + is also (...) finitely axiomatized. Finally, we give examples of cases where the join of two varieties is their Cartesian product. (shrink)

We develop a general algebraic and proof-theoretic study of substructural logics that may lack associativity, along with other structural rules. Our study extends existing work on substructural logics over the full Lambek Calculus [34], Galatos and Ono [18], Galatos et al. [17]). We present a Gentzen-style sequent system that lacks the structural rules of contraction, weakening, exchange and associativity, and can be considered a non-associative formulation of . Moreover, we introduce an equivalent Hilbert-style system and show that the logic associated (...) with and is algebraizable, with the variety of residuated lattice-ordered groupoids with unit serving as its equivalent algebraic semantics. Overcoming technical complications arising from the lack of associativity, we introduce a generalized version of a logical matrix and apply the method of quasicompletions to obtain an algebra and a quasiembedding from the matrix to the algebra. By applying the general result to specific cases, we obtain important logical and algebraic properties, including the cut elimination of and various extensions, the strong separation of , and the finite generation of the variety of residuated lattice-ordered groupoids with unit. (shrink)

Accusations of sexual creepiness are on the rise, but are such accusations morally problematic? Legal scholar Heidi Matthews thinks so, arguing that sexual creepiness as a category is in tension with liberal and progressive moral commitments. Principled liberals and progressives can reject creepiness as a category, but the costs of abandoning sexual creepiness may be high. Empirical findings about who gets accused of being creepy suggest that the creepiness norm is being repurposed to control male sexual advances in two ways: (...) first, by discouraging substandard male suitors from approaching young women unlikely to be interested in them (“prefiltration”), and second, by deflecting eligible older men away from young women and towards older women (“redirection”). If something like this hypothesis is correct, the ethical question liberals and progressives must wrestle with is whether these benefits justify maintenance of a norm that is (inter alia) lookist, ageist, sexist, sex-negative, and neuronormative. (shrink)

In this chapter we focus on the debate over publicly-maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the US (chiefly regarding the over 700 monuments devoted to the Confederacy), but to some degree also in Britain and Commonwealth countries, especially South Africa (chiefly regarding monuments devoted to figures and events associated with colonialism and apartheid). After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist, and neutrally categorize removalist (...) and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating, and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

In this chapter, we focus on the debate over publicly maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the United States and South Africa. After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist and neutrally categorize removalist and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put (...) on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

Faced with the choice between supporting industrial plant agriculture and hunting, Tom Regan’s rights view can be plausibly developed in a way that permits a form of hunting we call “dignitarian.” To motivate this claim, we begin by showing how the empirical literature on animal deaths in plant agriculture suggests that a non-trivial amount of hunting would not add to animal harm. We discuss how Tom Regan’s miniride principle appears to morally permit hunting in that case, and we address recent (...) objections by Jason Hanna to environmentally-based culling that may be seen to speak against this conclusion. We then turn to dignity, which is especially salient in scenarios where harm is necessary or justifiable. We situate “dignitarian” hunting within a larger framework of adversarial ethics, and argue that dignitarian hunting gives animals a more dignified death than the alternatives endemic to large-scale plant agriculture, and so is permissible based on the kinds of principles that Regan endorses. Indeed, dignitarian hunting may actually fit better with Regan’s widely endorsed animal rights framework than the practice of many vegans, and should only be rejected if we’re just as willing to condemn supporting conventional plant agriculture. (shrink)

[Updated 2/23/21: complete chapter scan] In this chapter I sketch a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. I begin by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. I then suggest a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments (...) or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and other “irrational” offenses more than to “objective” historical or philosophical critiques. (shrink)

Substructural logics have received a lot of attention in recent years from the communities of both logic and algebra. We discuss the algebraization of substructural logics over the full Lambek calculus and their connections to residuated lattices, and establish a weak form of the deduction theorem that is known as parametrized local deduction theorem. Finally, we study certain interpolation properties and explain how they imply the amalgamation property for certain varieties of residuated lattices.

Background: Withdrawal of treatment is a common practice in intensive care units when treatment is considered futile. Compassion is an important aspect of care; however, it has not been explored much within the context of treatment withdrawal in intensive care units. Objectives: The aim was to examine how concepts of compassion are framed, utilised and communicated by intensive care nurses in the context of treatment withdrawal. Design: The study employed a qualitative approach conducting secondary analysis of an original data set. (...) In the primary study, 13 nurses were recruited from three intensive care units within a large hospital in United Kingdom. Deductive framework analysis was used to analyse the data in relation to compassionate care. Ethical considerations: The primary study was approved by the local Research Ethics Committee and the hospital’s Research and Development services. Findings: Compassionate care was mostly directed to the patient’s family and was demonstrated through care and emotional support to the family. It was predominantly expressed through attempts to maintain the patient’s dignity by controlling symptoms, maintaining patient cleanliness and removing technical apparatus. Conclusion: This study’s findings provide insight about compassionate care during treatment withdrawal which could help to understand and develop further clinicians’ roles. Prioritising the family over the patient raised concerns among nurses, who motivated by compassion, may feel justified in taking measures that are in the interests of the family rather than the patient. Further work is needed to explore the ethics of this. (shrink)

Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...) account portrays honor norms as radically different from liberal ones, it actually strengthens Doris and Plakias’ case in some respects: cultures of honor are not merely superficially different from Western liberal ones. Nonetheless, the persistent appeal of honor’s principles, and their moral plausibility in certain contexts, suggests not antirealism, but pluralism—a reply on behalf of realism that itself has considerable empirical support. (shrink)

The mechanism-realist paradigm in the philosophy of science, championed by Mario Bunge and Roy Bhaskar, sets certain expectations for the substantive social-scientific application of the paradigm. To evaluate the application of the paradigm in accomplished substantive research, as well as the potential for future research, I examine the work of Charles Tilly, the exemplary substantive work in the mechanism-realist tradition. Based on this examination, I argue for the usefulness of explanatory mechanisms, provided that they are couched in terms of a (...) heuristic. Such a position is the most reasonable one to adopt given the expectations set by the paradigm in relation to complexity stemming from mechanism interaction and to a notion of causality that is deeper than that acknowledged by empiricism and positivism. (shrink)

Controversially, psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson advises “enforced monogamy” for societies with high percentages of “incels.” As Peterson’s proposal resonates in manosphere circles, this chapter reconstructs and briefly evaluates the argument for it. Premised on the moral importance of civilizational sustainability, advocates argue that both polygamous and socially monogamous but sexually liberal mating patterns result in unsustainable proportions of unattached young men. Given the premises, monogamous societies are probably justified in maintaining their anti-polygamist social and legal norms. The case (...) for imposing stricter sexual norms on socially monogamous but sexually liberal societies is weaker, however, as male involuntary celibacy in those places isn’t as directly caused by male intrasexual competition, and since less intrusive social interventions are more likely to ameliorate “the incel problem.”. (shrink)

We focus on the theory of abstraction proposed by the target article. We suggest that abstraction varies at different levels of learning, cognitive development, or cognitive ability. We argue that this theory does not specify how abstraction is done at each of these levels. Because of these weaknesses, the theory cannot explicate how individuals differ in mental time travel at different phases of life or different levels of cognitive ability.

This commentary compares the P-FIT model with psychometric and developmental models of intelligence and shows that there are isomorphisms and divergences between them. All three models involve some common dimensions, but the P-FIT model lacks many of the dimensions of the other models. Then we point to research that can lead to the integration of brain models with cognitive-developmental models.

Writing a history of ancient Greece, in periods of political turbulence and transition, involved the construction of an edifying platform for civil conduct. Britain, 1770-1850, was one such period. In examining Athenian democracy the British historians of the late eighteenth century, like William Mitford and John Gillies, found a convenient channel to articulate their private political preferences and antipathies, thereby accentuating the ideological antagonism of the post-revolutionary age. Athenian liberalism was deliberately drawn from oblivion only to be set as a (...) constitutional example to avoid, whereas the merits of the mixed British constitution were distinctly exposed. The British Utilitarians, by contrast, produced a case on behalf of representative government that included the basic characteristics of democracy and which witnessed its minimum prototype in ancient Athens. George Grote assumed the task of upsetting the conventional idea of Athens, thus perpetuating the typical association of Greek historiography with contemporary political discussion. (shrink)

This article investigates online representations and evaluations of EU migrants, focusing on the notion of ‘benefit tourism’ and discursive strategies used in the (de)legitimization of new welfare restrictions in the UK. Through the examination of online newspapers and corresponding public comment threads, this article adopts theoretical and methodological premises from Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), drawing upon the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to provide both a politically motivated as well as reflexive account. Although new participatory structures allow for resistance to emerge, the (...) openness, scalability and anonymity of the internet also allows for the spread of discrimination through the construction of EU migrants (in particular Bulgarians and Romanians) as the ‘Other’. (shrink)

Seize plaques de marbres du gymnase d’Andros ont été trouvées à l’état fragmentaire. De longueur et largeur irrégulières, mais de hauteur constante, elles vont s’épaississant régulièrement d’un long côté à l’autre. Des graffiti sont inscrits sur le côté vertical et étroit de ces plaques, plus rarement aussi sur un autre côté. Ces plaques rappellent les bancs des gymnases et des palestres où, dans ce que l’on appelle l’ephebeion, les jeunes gens assistaient aux leçons. Les graffiti trouvés dans cette pièce reflètent (...) la vanité des éphèbes. Le soin de la gravure sur deux des plaques (n° 1-2) permet de déduire que les graffiti ont d’abord été inscrits sous les auspices d’un magistrat tel que le gymnasiarque. Le nom de l’éphèbe parvenu à l’âge adulte pouvait être effacé et remplacé par un autre nom, mais la gravure ne révèle plus le même soin. L’étude de la prosopographie d’Andros et du contexte historique permet de dater les plaques du début du IIe s. av. J.-C. leur utilisation s’étendant au cours des IIe et Ier s. av. J.-C. (shrink)

Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the fetishistic impulse, (...) by 2) “sublimating” our fetishism into liberal rationales, or by 3) accepting the fetishism on its own terms. Of these options, I argue that sublimating our fetishism is not advisable, and that embracing our ethical fetishism isn’t as obviously misguided as some suggest. (shrink)

The Bioethics Committee of the Church of Greece, headed by Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia and Lavreotiki, was founded a few years ago, bringing together clergy, medical and legal experts. In his address, Metropolitan Nikolaos explains the concerns and the conditions that led to its foundation and he outlines some of the activities and the principles of the Committee. This address, a somewhat broad-brush presentation of the state of bioethics in Greece, is offered as a proposal as to how (...) the Church can work within a secular state, and how it can attempt to raise awareness about the spiritual aspect of bioethical concerns. Overall, the Bioethics Committee tries to promote public dialogue about sensitive bioethical issues, and to make sure that the spiritual perspective is duly informed by medical science. In addition, the Committee tries to make sure that the spiritual perspective is considered by the state in the face of existing or emerging law that touches on bioethical concerns. (shrink)

Just War Theory (JWT) replaced an older "warrior code," an approach to war that remains poorly understood and dismissively treated in the philosophical literature. This paper builds on recent work on honor to address these deficiencies. By providing a clear, systematic exposition of "Honor War Theory" (HWT), we can make sense of paradigm instances of warrior psychology and behavior, and understand the warrior code as the martial expression of a broader honor-based ethos that conceives of obligation in terms of fair (...) competition for prestige. Far from being a romantic and outmoded approach to war, HWT accounts for current conflicts and predicts moral intuitions that JWT either rejects or cannot comfortably accommodate. So although it is not recommended as a replacement for JWT, there is good reason think that a fully mature, realistic, and yet properly normative theory of war ethics will incorporate a variety of insights from HWT. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument is among the most famous and resilient manipulation arguments against compatibilism. I contend that its resilience is not a function of the argument's soundness but, rather, the ill-gotten gain from an ambiguity in the description of the causal relations found in the argument's foundational case. I expose this crucial ambiguity and suggest that a dilemma faces anyone hoping to resolve it. After a thorough search for an interpretation which avoids both horns of this dilemma, I conclude (...) that none is available. Rather, every metaphysically coherent interpretation invites either a hard- or soft-line reply to Pereboom's argument. I then consider a recharacterization of the dilemma which seems to clear the way for the defence of a revised Four-Case Argument. I address this rejoinder by identifying a still more fundamental problem shared by all viable interpretations of the manipulation cases, showing that each involves a type of manipulation which undermines the victim's agency. Because this diagnosis supports a soft-line reply to every viable interpretation of the argument and can be endorsed by any compatibilist, I consider it the final piece of the Soft-line Solution to the Four-Case Argument. Finally, I suggest a new taxonomy of manipulation arguments, arguing that none that employs the suppressive variety of manipulation found in Pereboom's argument offers a threat to compatibilism. -/- (For direct download option, search Kristin M. Mickelson, Soft-line Solution). (shrink)

Whereas civil discourse is usually thought to be about defusing conflict, this essay argues it may be fruitfully thought of as fighting honorably for what we believe. Thus agonistic honor, which conceives of rightness in terms of fair and respectful contest for status, will be an especially important virtue in contexts—from classrooms to courtrooms to pluralistic democracies in general—where conflict is inevitable and desirable. To motivate this claim, I take a Hobbesian approach. I begin with a rational reconstruction of honor (...) patterned after Hobbes’ rational reconstruction of justice, and imagine honor-equivalents of “rational” individuals in a “state of nature.” I then describe a multi-stage process that culminates in honorable contests among a natural aristocracy. The lessons from this exercise apply to the question of civil discourse: while the "standard model" of civil discourse aims at resolving disagreement by downplaying rivalry and ego, the more realistic agonistic model harnesses these factors to make our civil debates more culturally sustainable. (shrink)

Essays on the ethics of monuments tend to focus on their morality in relation to domestic populations. In this article we turn our attention to how the principles we favor for the ‘ingroup’ apply to various ‘outgroups’, including foreigners and foreign governments, guest workers, visiting scholars, forcibly annexed or colonized peoples, and migrant communities. It argues that nations have a prima facie moral right to erect and maintain monuments offensive to foreigners and foreign governments or (in the case of institutions) (...) rivals. Furthermore, we hold that whereas prospective immigrants have little standing to advocate for the removal of monuments they find offensive in their receiving countries, those who have been forcibly annexed have a much greater claim to inoffensive memorialization, contingent on their willingness to be countrymen with the descendants of their former oppressors and principles of reasonably charitable interpretation. Lastly, the article advocates for the protection of heritage landscapes from foreign influence and highlights the responsibilities of migrant populations to avoid memorializing their old grievances in ways that undermine the interests of their adopted nations. (shrink)

From Thomas Hobbes to Steven Pinker, it is often remarked that cultures of honor are destabilizing and especially dangerous to liberal institutions. This essay sharpens that criticism into two objections: one saying honor cultures encourage tyranny, and another accusing them of undermining rule of law. Since these concerns manifest differently in established as opposed to fledgling liberal democracies, I appeal to Western and African examples both to motivate and allay these worries. I contend that a culture of civic honor is (...) perfectly capable of offering those with soaring ambitions all the civic distinction they could hope for—including civic immortality—without tempting them to seize undemocratic levels of power. And as for rule of law and public order, an “irrationally” defiant response to the indignity of state-sanctioned oppression has often animated citizens to resist illiberal regimes despite great peril. Thus, cultures of civic honor are not only compatible with, but sometimes necessary to, founding and maintaining liberal institutions. (shrink)

This is my reply essay (1000 words) to Travis Timmerman's "A Case for Removing Confederate Monuments" in Bob Fisher's _Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us_ volume (2020). In it, I explain why I think the mere harm from the racial offense a monument may cause does not justify removing it.

Equivalences and translations between consequence relations abound in logic. The notion of equivalence can be defined syntactically, in terms of translations of formulas, and order-theoretically, in terms of the associated lattices of theories. W. Blok and D. Pigozzi proved in [4] that the two definitions coincide in the case of an algebraizable sentential deductive system. A refined treatment of this equivalence was provided by W. Blok and B. Jónsson in [3]. Other authors have extended this result to the cases of (...) k-deductive systems and of consequence relations on associative, commutative, multiple conclusion sequents. Our main result subsumes all existing results in the literature and reveals their common character. The proofs are of order-theoretic and categorical nature. (shrink)